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The Exclusionary Rule In The United Kingdom, United States And China
2008-2-28
 

The Exclusionary Rule In The United Kingdom, United States And China

 

Kuo-Hsing Hsieh

BIO: Ph.D. candidate, School of Law, the University of Edinburgh.

I. Introduction

The traditional Chinese criminal justice system emphasized substantial justice and truth-finding. From Qin dynasty (221-207 B.C.), torture was part of the ordinary criminal procedure. Not only the suspects, but also the informant and witness may be suffered from torture. In the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), the magistrates were allowed to apply torture to find the “truth.” The traditional legal culture, to some extent, has influenced the law in practice, for example, reliance on confession from torture, excessive periods of detention and witnesses’ reluctance to testify. In my view the ancient Chinese criminal justice system approximates fairly closely the dictates of the crime control model.

There are two goals of regulating the criminal process: first is to bring suspected offenders to trial so as to produce accurate determinations, and to ensure that fundamental rights are protected in those processes.[1] People’s Republic of China has undergone significant legal changes in criminal justice systems. The Chinese criminal justice system appears to comply with many international requirements. The Chinese Criminal Procedure Law provides the right to independent tribunal,[2] the presumption of innocence,[3] the right to an adequate defense,[4] and the prohibition of torture, threat, enticement, deceit or other unlawful means.[5] In addition, the Chinese Judges Law provides judges the right to be free from external inference in their work.[6] However, the “gap problem”, the huge gap between how law is written in the books and how it is practiced by legal actors, is serious in China.

In 1988, China ratified the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Since 1996, under the external and internal pressure, China has made substantial strides in formalizing its criminal justice system by amending, enacting new laws and creating new policy agencies. Many amendments were made to the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law and Criminal Law to ensure the protection of defendants’ rights. In 1997, China signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) had been signed next year. In 2002, China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2004, Chinese Constitution Article 33, for the first time, provides “the country respect and protect human rights.”

A decade later, however, according to the 2006 Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s report to the National People’s Congress presented in March 2006 (covering the year 2005), 599 civil servants had been investigated for suspected criminal activity in cases involving “illegal detention, coercion of confessions, using violence to obtain evidence and abuse of detainees.” These official figures are clearly the tip of the iceberg in a country according to the size of China.

Overall speaking, legal scholars have paid limited attention to criminal justice reforms in China. Nor have political scientists, sociologists, or anthropologists devoted much time to analyzing developments in related issues.

The Article therefore begins by comparing the interesting similarities and differences about the exclusionary rule issues in the United Kingdom and United States in Part II and III. Part IV explores the insufficiency of the previous research. The important rationales of the exclusionary rule will be discussed in Part V. Finally, and crucially, Part VI concludes that the separation of powers principle and exclusionary rule are two effective ways to solve the “gap problem” in China.

II. We are very much alike

The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storms may enter; the rain may enter – but the King of England cannot enter; all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.

                                                     William Pitt[7]

The power of a police officer in conducting a search is enormous. He or she is entitled forcibly to enter the citizen’s home, even at midnight, to wake a person from sleep, rummage in his or her drawers, papers, letters and most private possessions, or upset the entire building. Although the particularity clause of the warrant defines the scope of a search, it is heard that the police allegedly abuse their search authority.[8] Some people have even lost their lives during police searches in the United States. For example, in 2006, a police SWAT team in Atlanta stormed a house and shot a 92-year-old woman, Kathryn Johnston, who lives alone in the roughest neighborhood in Georgia. The police claimed that they had made a drug buy at the home from a man known only as Sam and were returning to search the residence.[9]

In 1761, a group of Boston merchants retained Attorney James Otis, Jr. to challenge the legality of the writs of assistance for the first time. The writs were general search warrants that permitted the authorities to search whoever and wherever they pleased for any reason – or for no reason. Section 5(2) of the Act of Frauds of 1662 provided:

And it shall be lawful to or for any Person or Persons, authorized by Writ of Assistance under the Seal of his Majesty’s Court of Exchequer, to take a Constable…. or other publick Officer inhabiting near unto the Place, and in the Day-time to enter…. Any House…. Or other Place, and in Case of Resistance to break open Doors, Chests, Trunks and other Package, there to seize, and from thence to bring, any Kind of Goods or Merchandize whatsoever, prohibited, and to put and secure the same in his Majesty’s Store-house.[10]

    Otis attacked the writs:

It appears to me the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and to the fundamental principles of law that was ever found in an English law book. It is the power that places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer…. One of the most essential branches of English liberty is the freedom of one’s house. A man’s house is his castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is well guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege. Custom house officers may enter our houses when they please – we are commanded to permit their entry – their menial servants may entry – may break locks, bars and everything in their way – and whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire – bare suspicion without oath is sufficient.[11]

    Although the Superior Court upheld the legality of the writs, John Adams had seen Otis’s speech as the prologue to the American Revolution.[12]

There were two most famous related English cases decided by Lord Charles Pratt Camden.[13] The first is Wilkes v. Wood. In 1763, John Wilkes, a member of the House of Commons, published a pamphlet series vehemently attacking the British government. Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State, issued a general warrant and ordered four messengers to search for, arrest and seize the authors, printers, and publisher, as well as their papers. Wilkes’ bureau was thoroughly ransacked, and all his books and private papers were seized and taken away. Forty-nine persons were arrested in three days on the strength of that single warrant. Wilkes challenged the legality of the general warrant in civil damage suits. Chief Justice Charles Pratt held the general warrants were null and void and that Wilkes could recover damages for the illegal search and seizure:

To enter a man’s house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would wish to live an hour…. If such a power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.[14]

    The second is Entick v. Carrington. In 1762, according to the executive warrant issued by the Earl of Halifax, the secretary of state, the defendants Nathan Carrington and others, with force and arms broke and entered John Entick’s dwelling-house, broke open the doors, chests, drawers, searched and examined all the rooms in his dwelling, house and all the boxes, and took away hundreds of printed charts, pamphlets and papers. Entick was suspected of publishing seditious libels. He sued the defendants for trespass. The jury found that the defendants did trespass and awarded him three hundred pounds. This judgment exercised great influence on the subsequent cases of search law in England as well as in the United States. Lord Camden found the warrant was wholly illegal and void:

If this point should be determined in favor of the jurisdiction, the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a seditious libel…. If this is the law it would be found in our books, but no such law ever existed in this country. Our law holds the property of every man so sacred that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave. If he does, he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law…. We can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the defendants in what they have done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society, for papers are often the dearest property a man can have.[15]

As news spread about the ruling, Lord Camden was hailed both on England and America for his bold and clear-eyed expression of the common law and the rights of Englishmen.[16]

The United Kingdom (except Scotland) and United States share the same common law roots from England. In the past, English judges have often prided themselves as protectors of citizens’ rights.[17] At first sight, the similarities of two respective criminal justice systems are particularly striking in many ways, for example, the emphasis on adversary system, the presumption of innocence, and the sense of fundamental fairness required for a just procedure. Equally striking, however, is the lack of similarities between the two systems in significant areas, for instance, the admissibility of illegally or improperly obtained evidence in criminal trials.

III. But oh the difference

Courts and scholars have not formulated a universal definition of the exclusionary rule of evidence. My definition is “a rule that excludes evidence obtained by illegal or improper methods,” for example, by illegal search or torture. There are at least three differences about the exclusionary rule between the two criminal justice systems.

First, the English judges seemed reluctant to exclude illegal evidence from 1978.

From the 1960s, English courts have increasingly extended police powers, especially in search and seizure and pre-charge detention for investigation.[18] Since 1978, courts were almost unwilling to exercise their discretion to exclude illegally or improperly obtained evidence. For instance, in R v. Houghton and Franciosy,[19] the Court ruled that a judge was right not to exclude a confession even though the defendant had been unlawfully arrested, unlawfully detained incommunicado for five days, and questioned without caution. In general, judges in postwar England and Wales became increasingly accommodating to police demands for additional powers: they retreated from control of police, while senior American (in the 1960s) and Australian (in the 1980s) judges attempted to advance.[20] In the leading case of R v. Sang, as Lord Diplock noted:

[The trial judge] has no discretion to refuse to admit relevant admissible evidence on the ground that it was obtained by improper or unfair means. The court is not concerned with how it was obtained.[21]

In the United States, under the exclusionary rule of evidence, evidence which is obtained by an unlawful search and seizure is excluded from admissibility in accordance with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This provision provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

In 1914, the United States Supreme Court first held that “in a federal prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure” in Weeks v. United States, in which Justice Day noted:

The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States…. against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not.[22]

Second, the rationales for the exclusionary rule are very different.

The English courts have repudiated the idea of using exclusion of illegally obtained evidence as a deterrent against police misconduct. In Sang, Lord Diplock observed:

It is no part of a judge’s function to exercise disciplinary powers over the police or prosecution as respects the way in which evidence to be used at the trial is obtained by them.

Lord Scarman pointed out:

The role of the judge is confined to the forensic process. He controls neither the police nor the prosecuting authority.[23]

In Hughes, Lord Taylor emphasized that:

It has been said more than once in this court that the object of a judge in considering the application of section 78 is not to discipline or punish police officers or customs officers for breaches of the code.[24]

In contrast, the United States Supreme Court first recognized that the only effective way to deter police misconduct is to exclude illegal evidence in Weeks.[25] Since 1961, the Court has systematically ignored all but the deterrence rationale for the rule. The essence of the rationale is that it allows the courts to control the activities of the law enforcement agencies and dissuade them from encroaching unjustifiably on the civil liberties of citizens. For example, in United States v. Calandra, Justice Powell observed:

A judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.[26]

Third, the judicial attitudes towards evidence obtained in undercover police operations are different.

“Entrapment” refers to the state entice its citizens into committing crimes, by its agents, in order to prosecute them for doing so. Under English criminal law, there is no substantive entrapment defence, but that entrapment can be taken into account in mitigation of sentence.[27] Professor Ashworth also observed that “the English courts have been excessively coy about entrapment.”[28]

In Sang, Lord Scarman said succinctly:

If a crime is brought about by the activities of someone who can be described as an agent provocateur, although that may be an important matter in regard to sentence, it does not affect the question of guilty or not guilty.[29]

  In R v. Looseley; Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 2000), Lord Hoffmann stated:

The fact that the accused was entrapped is not inconsistent with his having broken the law. The entrapment will usually have achieved its object in causing him to do the prohibited act with the necessary guilty intent. So far as I know, the contrary view is held only in the Federal jurisdiction of the United States.[30]

In contrast to the British approach, the United States Supreme Court first recognized the entrapment defense in Sorrells v. United States in 1932. In the words of Chief Justice Hughes:

Such a gross abuse of authority given for the purpose of detecting and punishing crime, and not for the making of criminals, deserves the severest condemnation.[31]

Two decades ago, Professor Robinson, one of the world’s leading scholars on criminal law, has noted that “nearly every American jurisdiction now recognizes some form of the entrapment defense.[32] The defense is now codified in twenty-six states.[33] In other states, the defense is a judicial creation.

Fourth, there is a difference about the admissibility of derivative evidence from illegally obtained real evidence and inadmissible confessions. For example, an illegal search may find out a key to a railway station locker where the money of a robbery is being kept. Or a confession obtained by torture may reveal the whereabouts of the murder knife.

Under English law, evidence derived from an illegal confession is admissible. In R. v. Warickshall,[34] Warickshall was charged with being an accessory after the fact to theft and with receiving the stolen property. The issue was the admissibility of stolen goods which had been found in her bed to which her confession had led the authorities. The confession was made after the defendant was promised that she would not be prosecuted if she confessed. After she made a full confession, however, a prosecution took place. Her confession was excluded as evidence, but the real evidence was included.

In addition, Section 76(4) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 explicitly rejects the admissibility of derivative evidence and provides:

The fact that a confession is wholly or partly excluded in pursuance of this section shall not affect the admissibility in evidence – (a) of any facts discovered as a result of the confession; or (b) where the confession is relevant as showing that the accused speaks, writes or expresses himself in a particular way, of so much of the confession as is necessary to show that he does so.[35]

In contrast to English approach, in the United States, the derivative evidence should be excluded, if there is close connexion between the initial illegality and subsequently discovered evidence. In addition, Justice Frankfurter first coined the phrase “fruit of poisonous tree” in Nardone v. United States in 1939 and stated:

[T]o forbid the direct use of methods [but] to put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.[36]

IV. Further examination

The exclusionary rule is one of the most difficult,[37] controversial[38] and complex doctrines in criminal procedure and evidence law. This rule is multifaceted and ever-changing. Professor Dennis has also noticed that “[t]he law in this area is complex and still developing.”[39]

There are several types of evidence to be considered for exclusion. For instance, confessions obtained by torture or oppression; non-confessional evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure; entrapment obtained by inducing or participating in the commission of the crime, evidence obtained by deception, trick, intercepting, recording of communication, undercover police and electronic surveillance.

Some of the previous studies are insufficient and incomplete in terms of their scope and depth; they over-simplified this complicated issue in three ways.

First, Professor Tapper notes that “in England, illegally obtained evidence is admissible as a matter of law, provided that it involves neither a reference to an inadmissible confession of guilt, nor the commission of an act of contempt of court.”[40] Professor Duff says that “the issue of the admissibility of improperly obtained real evidence bedevils most jurisdictions…. solutions range from almost always admitting such evidence – the historical position in England law – to almost always excluding it – the recent approach in the USA.”[41]

As a matter of fact, in the past two decades, there has been a trend in Europe to expand the use of the exclusionary rule,[42] including the United Kingdom. In 1984, the English criminal justice system began a process of reconstruction. There are four grounds of exclusion under of the PACE. Section 76(2) requires exclusion of confession (a) obtained by oppression or (b) likely to have been rendered unreliable by anything said or done by anyone.[43] Section 78(1) provides that: “the court may refuse to allow evidence…. if it appears…. that…. the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.”[44] In addition, Section 82(3) saves “pre-existing common law powers…. to exclude evidence whose prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.”[45]

For the first time in the history of British criminal justice, the judiciary were given statutory power to exclude improperly obtained non-confessional evidence.[46] Judges don’t need to consider whether they have discretion to exclude relevant evidence.

In the United States, the intense debate of the exclusionary rule has been lasted for almost one hundred years. In 1922, Dean John H. Wigmore had stated bluntly:

[The exclusionary rule] puts [courts] in the position of assisting to undermine the foundations of the very institutions they are set there to protect. It regards the over-zealous officer of the law as a greater danger to the community than the unpunished murderer or embezzler or panderer.[47]

Since 1970s, the Supreme Court has limited the scope and application of the rule and has repeatedly created exceptions. Presently, there exist the following exceptions: independent source,[48] good faith,[49] inevitable discovery,[50] purged taint,[51] impeachment,[52] harmless error exception[53] and rule of attenuation.[54]

The rule is very controversial. Some judges, including the Chief Justice, opposed the rule. For example, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,[55] F.B.I. agents raided a suspect’s home, handcuffed him in front of his family, and searched for drugs. Finding none, they took him to the station house where he was strip searched, interrogated, and eventually released. The suspect, Bivens, then brought a civil action against the federal government.

 Although the Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he had suffered as a result of the agents’ violation of the Fourth Amendment, in Chief Justice Burger’s dissent, he totally rejected the exclusionary rule and attacked the rule for inadequately protecting the rights of suspects, failing to sanction the officer who conducted the illegal action, and wrongfully punishing prosecutors, who are powerless to correct police misconduct.

In 1995, the Senate was considering to completely eliminate the exclusionary rule in the proposed Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 1995, although it didn’t succeed, which stated that:

Evidence which is obtained as a result of a search or seize shall not be excluded in a proceeding in a court of the United States, on the ground that the search or seizure was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the constitution of the United States, if the search or seizure was carried out in circumstances justifying an objectively reasonable belief that it was in conformity with the Fourth Amendment.[56]

Second, there has been little analysis of the exclusionary rule and its related issues in Scotland. The Scottish decisions perceive themselves to be steering somewhat of a middle course between the automatic exclusion and the unquestioned admissibility.[57] It is a topic that requires further examination.

Third, although much has recently been written on the issue of the prohibition of torture[58] in the context of terrorism, the discussion has expended very little attention on the question of whether evidence obtained by torture would be admissible.

Additionally, there are still many profound, important and difficult questions unanswered. These questions are full of conflicts and dilemmas.

(1)   Does and should the exclusionary rule not only just apply to ordinary criminals, but also to terrorists, murderers and rapists? Should we carve out categories of people, the full force of the rule do not apply? The conclusion is that I believe strongly the rule must apply to everyone.

(2)   How to bridge the gap between confessional and non-confessional evidence? There is a huge gap between them. As a matter of law, the general rule about non-confessional evidence is “it matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible.”[59] In other words, “the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible, and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained.”[60] If reliable evidence exists, it would be regrettable not to use it, and to risk the acquittal of a guilty person; why cannot we apply the rule to confessional evidence to obtain more evidence and apprehend more criminals? If an involuntary confession is corroborated and there is no doubt about its trustworthiness, can the criminal justice system make use of it? In general, if a confession had been obtained by police methods that rendered it involuntary or coerced – and thus violated due process law – it had to be excluded, however verifiable. It was so clear and simple. But why is it not that simple when non-confessional evidence is obtained in violation of due process, when the police have violated a constitutional protection that is basic to a free society.[61]

(3)   Why some of the police prefer using illegal or improper methods to procure evidence? Whether police should be permitted to use deception to extract confessions from suspects? If it is not a judge’s function to discipline the police conduct, who should take responsibilities of regulating police misconduct? According to my research and ten years’ prosecutor and criminal judge experience, I firmly argue that the police system will not seriously discipline their “brothers” who go beyond permissible limits in their eagerness to secure valuable evidence against the “bad guys.”[62] Some high-ranking police officers who ordered that pain be inflicted on the suspect even considered themselves crime fighters.[63] It is rather a naive view of depending on the police to safeguard civil rights.

(4)   How should we apply constitutional protections from the eighteenth century to today’s computerized world? For instance, can the police use infrared thermal imaging device at a suspect’s home? Searching and seizing computers are common during criminal investigation nowadays. How does the exclusionary rule govern the steps that an investigator takes when retrieving evidence from a personal computer?

(5)   The exclusionary rule reveals the fundamental tension between the social need for order and individuals’ desire for privacy and liberty. Can both ideologies be pursued simultaneously without compromise? In the leading case of Lawrie v. Muir in Scotland, Lord Justice-General Cooper highlighted that:

The law must strive to reconcile two highly important interests which are liable to come into conflict – (a) the interest of the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregular invasions of his liberties by the authorities, and (b) the interest of the State to secure that evidence bearing upon the commission of crime and necessary to enable justice to be done shall not be withheld from Courts of law on any merely formal or technical ground.[64]

The crucial question is, “How to balance the two conflicting interests?” The dilemma is the gravity of serious crimes always will by definition exceed the gravity of almost any illegal or irregular invasions of citizens’ liberties. It seems always worse to be murdered or raped than to have one’s house searched without a warrant or to have a suspect to be tortured, no matter how serious the latter violation.

(6)   What is the admissibility of evidence obtained in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights (ECHR)?

    The British Parliament incorporated the ECHR in its domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998, which became effective in 2000. The Act requires British courts to act in accordance with rights protected by the Convention. For example, Article 3, which guarantees freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, is relevant to the possible exclusion of a confession. Article 6 offers sophisticated protections for the right to a fair trial.

    Many of the covert and intrusive methods used by police violated the suspect’s right to respect for a private life, in breach of Article 8. In Khan v. UK,[65] the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the admission of evidence obtained by means of a listening device in breach of Article 8 did not automatically render the proceedings unfair. However, first, does it make a fair trial where evidence is relied on which was obtained in breach of the human rights guaranteed by the Convention? Second, is such evidence admissible? I argue that the security of one’s privacy against intrusion by the government is inextricable from the conception of fair trial.

V. The rule in China

Between 2002 and 2006, international organizations issued at least six reports in China.[66] Each of these reports analyzed some aspects of Chinese criminal process. All described a system with arbitrary arrest and lengthy detention of suspects, the systematic use of torture and other coercive measures by police authorities to obtain confessions, the routine use of coerced confessions to obtain convictions and denial of due process.

All of the reports have concluded with recommendations for improving the Chinese criminal justice system and its compliance with international human rights laws. Proposals include enhancing professionalism, efficiency, transparency; raising the status and independence of judges within the Chinese legal system. All these studies, however, are too broad and general.

First of all, some of the previous studies are questionable. For example, Professor Conner claims that “confessions have remained central to the criminal justice system in the PRC, and it seems that few cases now could end without one… The result is a system seemingly more arbitrary than that of the Qing – and less subject to the rule of law.”[67] However, first, she didn’t analyze any case at all. Second, she didn’t provide any convincing evidence to support that the system in China is arbitrary than that of the Qing.

In the second place, previous research has focused almost entirely on the ethical aspects of general human rights and broad description of the Chinese legal system operation.[68] They completely ignored the key question, namely, how to solve the “gap problem”?

I argue that the separation of powers and exclusionary rule are two effective ways to solve the “gap problem.” Furthermore, the separation of powers is the basis of the exclusionary rule.

This is not merely a problem in the evidence law. We should elevate the exclusionary rule to a new level of Constitution law. The Chinese Constitution, to some extent, also recognize the separation of powers principle requiring each branch to respect the constitutional responsibilities that have been assigned to the rival branches. Article 126 of the Chinese Constitution provides:

The People’s Courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power independently, and are not subject to interference by any administrative organs, public organizations or individuals.

In addition, the “legal foundation” of torture in China is Article 93 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law (CCPL), which provides:

When interrogating a criminal suspect, the investigators shall first ask the criminal suspect whether or not he has committed any criminal act, and let him state the circumstances of his guilt or explain his innocence; then may ask him questions. The criminal suspect shall answer the investigators’ questions truthfully, but he shall have the right to refuse to answer any questions that are irrelevant to the case.

Traditionally, a suspect who refuses to confess receives harsh treatment; however, a defendant who confesses often receives lenient punishment. The defendants’ cooperation with the police in investigations is highly expected. There was no right to silence for the accused in China. Under strike-hard campaigns, launched in early 1996 and has been an ongoing annual campaign, police usually are given a quota for how many suspects will be caught for various crimes.[69] If the suspects do not answer the investigators’ questions truthfully, in practice, according to the Article 93 of CCPL, some police will seek confessions at virtually all costs and use whatever techniques they can to extract them. This is the main reason why the police torture detainees in China. Any rationalizations of torture will help the practice thrive. Torture must be vigorously denounced under any circumstance.

As regards the rationales of the exclusionary rule, there are three reasons for excluding the confessions procured by torture. First, such statement is often unreliable. The police seek the suspect’s confession they believe the “bad guy” has committed. The victims often choose to tell the police whatever they want to hear in order to relieve their suffering.

Even the police was tortured. In 1994, Yu Xiang Lin’s wife Zhang Zai Yu left their home because of her mental illness. Yu was a police in Jing Shan County in Hu Bei Province, China. Zhang’s family suspected that their daughter, Zhang was murdered by Yu and they decided to inform the police. Three months later, an unidentified female dead body was found in a pond near Yu’s home. Yu was arrested because Zhang’s brother claimed the dead body looked like his sister.

Over a fortnight of police interrogation, Zhang only ate two meals a day; drank very little and was deprived of sleep. Yu was seriously tortured and was forced to confess the murder. Yu suggested four ways to “kill” his wife and let the police to pick one among them.

Yu was given a death penalty by the Jing Zhou Intermediate Court. He appealed. The Hu Bei Province High Court quashed the conviction because of insufficient evidence. After the intervention of the City and County Political-Legal Committees,[70] the case was transferred to the Jing Shan County Basic Court. The PLC asked the Jing Shan County Basic Court and Jing Zhou Intermediate Court to imprison Yu for fifteen years. Surprisingly, Zhang returned home one day in 2005. The Jing Shan County Basic Court retried and said Yu was completely innocent.[71]

Article 126 of the Chinese Constitution authorizes the courts to have independent judicial power. The Chinese Judges Law provides judges the right to be free from external inference in their work.[72] Article 8 Section 2 of the Law on the Organization of the People’s Courts also has regulations concerning the right of judges to adjudicate the case according to the law with no interference from administrative organizations, social groups or individuals. The judicial power must be separated from the executive, for instance, the Political-Legal Committee; otherwise the life and liberty of people would be exposed to arbitrary control.

It is the judges that are the chief guarantors of equal justice under the law. Most importantly, courts are in a position to educate the legislative and executive branches of government and to compel legislators and bureaucrats to respect the rights and legitimate interests of individuals.

In Yu case, why nobody, including judges, uses the DNA to identify the crucial dead body? The technological and forensic advances can prevent the police from using torture to obtain confessions. In many criminal cases, the scientific evidence alone proved enough. It is totally unnecessary to extract confessions by torture from the suspects.

Second, by excluding such evidence in court proceedings can establish a fair trial and preserve the integrity of the judicial process.

One of the most important global legal developments is the growing recognition that the suspect will be given a right to a fair trial in both international and domestic law. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 10 and 11,[73] the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights (ECHR) Article 6,[74] ICCPR Article 14[75] and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 Section 78(1).[76] It is unacceptable to use the confessions obtained by torture in court. The rule must exclude these statements in order to uphold the integrity of the administration of justice.

Some skeptics argue that the changes in the CCPL represent nothing more than a porous facade enacted to attract foreign investment.[77] Those changes will never be carried out in practice. In my view, contrary to some scholars’ gloomy predictions, China is striving for the creation of a relatively complete criminal code, intended to improve its criminal justice system.

In 1996 and 1997, China amended its CCPL and CCL respectively. The changes included the arrest and detention, presumption of innocence, lawyer participation, prosecutorial discretion and trial proceedings. These amendments are intended to protect the defendants’ rights. The Draft Uniform Rules of Evidence for China is now being drafted that will not only clarify evidentiary issues, including the exclusionary rule of evidence, but also address procedural rights issues.

Additionally, top court officials started to admit that coercive measures were used and increasingly focused on adhering to due process. In 1998, the President of the People’s Supreme Court Ren Jianxin stated that police misconduct represents a grave problem and said some law-enforcement officials have taken advantage of legal loopholes, intentionally misinterpreted the law, distorted evidence and broken the law they enforce.[78] In 2007, the President of the People’s Supreme Court Xiao Yang stated that “the court should endeavour to enforce the human rights protection in judicial arena and protect the defendants’ procedural rights.”[79]

My central argument is that the rule and fair trial are inextricably intertwined: their relationship is interactive; one cannot be understood without the other.

Third, prohibiting evidence obtained under torture could prevent torture from occurring.

    The history shows that when governments trade suspects’ rights with truth-finding, most often they get neither. The lesson of history is that, when the law is not there to keep watch over the illegal methods used by the investigators, the practice is always at risk of being resorted in one form or another.

VI. Conclusion

In China, the criminal procedure law has come a long way in a short period of time. The separation of powers and exclusionary rule are two crucial elements for China in the development of its fair administration of justice. The exclusionary rule will occupy the central place in the criminal justice system in China.

First, the separation of powers is the cornerstone of the exclusionary rule.

The British constitution is firmly based on the separation of powers doctrine. Parliament has the power to pass and repeal laws. The executive carries on the administration of the country. The courts interpret the laws. The separation of powers is the major principle of the United States Constitution. In addition, to some extent, the doctrine is also recognized by the Chinese Constitution.

    In the context of criminal justice system, in theory, the legislature passes criminal procedure laws; the executive enforces the laws; and the court interprets and applies the laws. Article 37 of the Chinese Constitution provides that:

The freedom of person of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable. No citizen may be arrested except with the approval or by decision of a people’s procuratorate or by decision of a people’s court, and arrests must be made by a public security organ. Unlawful deprivation or restriction of citizens’ freedom of person by detention or other means is prohibited; and unlawful search of the person of citizens is prohibited.

That means the police must obtain search warrants from judges before they invade the homes of people. When the police bypass the warrant application procedure, the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is necessary.

Second, China needs to continue in its efforts to prohibit torture, whether physical or mental, without any exception whatsoever, and any evidence obtained by torture would be inadmissible in court proceedings.

Finally, and crucially, the exclusionary rule extends to any statement which is established under torture including preventive torture. If China leaves the window open a crack and the wind chilled to the bone in imperial China will soon fill the whole room. Preventive torture can not switch off a ticking bomb. It is, per se, a bomb that will explode the whole criminal justice system.

 


英国、美国和中国的证据排除规则

KUO-HSING HSIEH

爱丁堡大学法学院博士候选人

 

在刑事司法制度方面,中华人民共和国已经经历了重大的法律转变。中国的刑事诉讼法规定了(接受)独立审判的权利,无罪推定原则,得到充分辩护的权利,以及禁止刑讯、威胁、诱供、骗供或其他非法行为。然而,在中国,存在着一个“断裂问题”,即书本上的法和实践中的法之间的断裂。

法学学者们已经部分地注意到了中国的证据排除规则改革。然而,之前的一些研究无论在其广度还是深度上都是有疑问的,(论述)也是不充分、不完善的;他们将这一复杂的问题过于简单化了。

文章以第二和第三部分比较英国与美国的证据排除规则之间有趣的相同点和不同点为开端。第四部分探讨了已往研究的不充分性。第五部分将讨论证据排除规则的重要原则。最后而且也是最关键的,第六部分得出本文的结论,即分权原则和证据排除规则是解决中国的“断裂问题”的两条有效途径。

在中国,刑事诉讼法在一个较短的时间内走过了一段漫长的道路。权利分立和证据排除规则是增进中国司法公正的两个关键因素。证据排除规则将在中国的刑事审判制度中占据核心地位。

首先,权力分立是证据排除规则的基石。

英国宪法牢固地根植于权力分立理论。国会有权制定和废止法律,执法机关通过国家的行政机构将其付诸实施,法院对法律进行解释。权力的分立也是美国宪法的重要原则。此外,在某种程度上,这一理论也被中国宪法所承认。

在刑事审判制度领域,从理论上来说,立法机关制定刑事诉讼法,执法机关实施这些法律,法院解释和适用法律。中国宪法第27条规定:

中华人民共和国公民的人身自由不受侵犯。任何公民,非经人民检察院批准或者决定或者人民法院决定,并由公安机关执行,不受逮捕。禁止非法拘禁和以其他方法非法剥夺或者限制公民的人身自由,禁止非法搜查公民的身体。

这就意味着警察在进入人民的住宅之前,必须从法官那里得到搜查令。如果警察规避了令状申请程序,那么对非法取得的证据的排除就成为一种必要。

其次,中国需要继续努力去禁止刑讯,不管是生理上的还是心理上的,任何情况下都没有任何的例外;同时,任何通过刑讯取得的证据都不应该在法庭审判中被采纳。

最后,也是最关键的,证据排除规则扩展到了任何基于刑讯包括保护性刑讯而产生的陈述中。如果中国将窗户打开一个裂缝,那么帝制时代的刺骨冷风将迅速弥漫于整个房间。保护性刑讯不能关掉这个定时炸弹,因为,从本质上来说,这是一颗将摧毁整个刑事审判制度的炸弹。

 



[1] A. Ashworth, and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process (3rd edn., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), 55.

[2] Article 5 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law provides:

The People’s Court shall exercise judicial power independently in accordance with law and the People’s Procuratorates shall exercise procuratorial power independently in accordance with law, and they shall be free from interference by any administrative organ, public organization or individual.

[3] Article 12 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law provides:

No person shall be found guilty without being judged as such by a People’s Court according to law.

[4] Article 34 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law provides:

If a case is to be brought in court by a public prosecutor and the defendant involved has not entrusted anyone to be his defender due to financial difficulties or other reasons, the People’s Court may designate a lawyer that is obligated to provide legal aid to serve as a defender.

[5] Article 43 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law provides:

Judges, procurators and investigators must, in accordance with the legally prescribed process, collect various kinds of evidence that can prove the criminal suspect’s or defendant’s guilt or innocence and the gravity of his crime. It shall be strictly forbidden to extort confessions by torture and to collect evidence by threat, enticement, deceit or other unlawful means.

[6] Article 43 of the Chinese Judges Law.

[7] L. W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999), 151.

[8] R v. Reading JJ ex p South West Meats Ltd (1992) 4 Admin LR 401. This case illustrates ways in which the police can abuse their powers of search and seizure, even with a warrant. Large quantities of documents were removed from the premises which obviously did not fall within the terms of the warrant, contrary to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 s 8(2).

[9] 92-year-old killed in ‘roughest neighborhood in Georgia’, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/11/22/woman.shot.ap/index.html (last visited July 20, 2007)

[10] J. W. Hall, Jr., Search and Seizure, (2d ed., Michie, 1991), 7.

[11] M. H. Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978), 344 (emphasis added).

[12] Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).

[13] Chief Justice Charles Pratt elevated to the peerage as Lord Camden after Wilkes.

[14] 19 Howell’s State Trials, 1153 (C.P. 1763).

[15] 19 Howell’s State Trials, 1029 (C.P. 1765).

[16] A. R. Amar, ‘The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance’, (1996) 30 Suffolk University Law Review 65.

[17] D. Dixon, Law in Policing: Legal Regulation and Police Practices, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), 70.

[18] Ibid., ch 4.

[19] (1978) 68 Cr App Rep 197.

[20] n. 17 above, at 142.

[21] [1980] AC 402.

[22] 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

[23] n. 21 above.

[24] [1994] 1 WLR 876.

[25] n. 22 above.

[26] 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (emphasis added).

[27] R v Springer [1999] 1 Cr App R(S) 217; R v Shannon [2001] 1 WLR 51.

[28] A. J. Ashworth, ‘Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights’ (1977) The Criminal Law Review 735.

[29] n. 21 above.

[30] [2001] UKHL 53.

[31] 287 U.S. 435 (1932). A prohibition agent had persistently sought alcohol from the defendant who eventually supplied it. His purpose was to prosecute the defendant for procuring and selling it. The defendant was then charged under the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA). The Sorrells Court adopted Judge Sanborn’s argument: “The first duties of the officers of the law are to prevent, not to punish crime. It is not their duty to incite to and create crime for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing it…. their first and chief endeavor was to cause, to create, crime in order to punish it, and it is unconscionable.” Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1921).

[32] P. H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses 2 (St. Paul, West Publishing, 1984), 509.

[33] P. Marcus, The Entrapment Defense (3rd edn., Charlottesville, Michie & Co., 2002), 705-15.

[34] In 1741, involuntary confessions were regarded as inadmissible in the Trial of Charles White (17 Howell’s State Trials 1079). In 1775, involuntary confessions were regarded as inadmissible in Rudd’s Case. However, in both cases the judges didn’t state why involuntary confessions are inadmissible.

[35] 287 U.S. 435 (1932). A prohibition agent had persistently sought alcohol from the defendant who eventually supplied it. His purpose was to prosecute the defendant for procuring and selling it. The defendant was then charged under the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA). The Sorrells Court adopted Judge Sanborn’s argument: “The first duties of the officers of the law are to prevent, not to punish crime. It is not their duty to incite to and create crime for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing it…. their first and chief endeavor was to cause, to create, crime in order to punish it, and it is unconscionable.” Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1921).

[36] 308 U.S. 338 (1939).

[37] Ross and Chalmers noted that “when it has been established that a piece of evidence has been obtained illegally or irregularly, the question as to whether in a particular case it is admissible or inadmissible is frequently one of difficulty.” M. L. Ross and J. Chalmers, Walker and Walker: The Law of Evidence in Scotland (Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 2000), 6.

[38] Professor Andrew Ashworth noted that “the right to be tried on evidence not obtained by violation of fundamental rights…. is a controversial right. It is not contained in the Convention as such; there are signs of its recognition in some decisions and not in others. It is accepted in English law to some degree, but not as a general proposition.” A. Ashworth, Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), 35; Ashworth and Redmayne noted that “where the police have evidence against suspect by unfair or illegally means, the courts face a difficult question: whether or not to admit the evidence.” A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), 314; Shanks noted that “few court-made rules have endured so much criticism or provoked so many attacks. B. F. Shanks, ‘Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives’ (1983) 57 Tulane Law Review 651; Fennelly noted that “no other doctrine in American criminal jurisprudence has generated more controversy or possessed such determined critics and supporters.” J. E. Fennelly, ‘Inevitable Discovery, the Exclusionary Rule and Military Due Process’ (1991) 131 Military Law Review 129.

[39] I. H. Dennis, The Law of Evidence (2nd edn., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), 231.

[40] C. Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence (10th edn., London, Butterworths, 2004), 538.

[41] P. Duff, ‘Admissibility of Improperly Obtained Physical Evidence in the Scottish Criminal Trial: the Search for Principle’ (2004) 8 Edinburgh Law Review 152.

[42] Italy, Spain and Russia, among other countries, have adopted a version of the exclusionary rule. In 1989, the new Italian Code of Criminal Procedure declares, “evidence acquired in violation of prohibitions established by the law may not be used.” Codice Di Procedura Penale [C.P.P.] art. 191(1) (Italy). In Spain, Article 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down the principle that “evidence obtained either directly or indirectly in contravention of fundamental rights and liberties will be of no effect.” In 2002, the new Russia Criminal Procedure Code became effective. Article 7(3) declares that a violation of the rules of this Code by a court, procurator, investigator, inquiry agency, or inquiring officer in the course of criminal proceedings shall cause the evidence thus obtained to be inadmissible, while Article 75(1) reinforces the rule that evidence obtained in violation of the requirements of this Code shall be inadmissible. L. Orland, ‘A Russian Legal Revolution: The 2002 Criminal Procedure Code, (2002) 18 Connecticut Journal of International Law 150.

[43] PACE, ch. 60, §76(2)(Eng.)

[44] Ibid., §78(1).

[45] D. Feldman, ‘Regulating Treatment of Suspects in Police Stations: Judicial Interpretation of Detention Provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984’ (1990) The Criminal Law Review 453.

[46] S. Sharpe, ‘Covert Policing: A Comparative View, (1996) 25 Anglo-American Law Review 165.

[47] J. H. Wigmore, ‘Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure’ (1922) 8 The American Bar Association Journal 482.

[48] Segura v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

[49] United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

[50] Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).

[51] Won Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

[52] Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).

[53] Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

[54] Nardone v. United States , 308 U.S. 338 (1939).

[55] 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

[56] Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 1995 Report Together with Dissenting Views (1995), Report 104-17, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.

[57] n. 41 above, at 152-3.

[58] A. M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat Responding to the Challenge (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002); O. Gross, ‘Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience’ (2003) 88 Minnesota Law Review 1481.

[59] R v. Leatham, (1861) 8 Cox CC 498.

[60] Kuruma Son of Kaniu v. Reginam, (1955) AC 197. Professor Robert and Zuckerman also criticized that “this pat rationalization is far too quick, and proves much too much.” P. Robert and A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), 150.

[61] Y. Kamisar, ‘The Writings of John Barker Waite and Thomas Davies on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule’ (2002) 100 Michigan Law Review 1828.

[62] Hsieh Kuo-hsing, ‘Rethinking the Exclusionary Rule of Evidence in the United States’ (2004) 49 Criminal Law Review 90.

[63] In 2002, a law student Magnus Gaefgen kidnapped Jakob von Metzler in Germany, the eleven-year-old son of a prosperous senior German bank executive. Three days later Gaefgen was arrested by the Frankfurt police after the police watched him pick up the one million Euros ransom. For seven hours the day before, interrogators had tried every means in the book to get Gaefgen to tell them where he was keeping the boy. Gaefgen refused to disclose the whereabouts of the kidnapped boy and sent the police off to search one false location after another. Police were nervous that the imprisoned child would suffocate or freeze in his hideaway. Wolfgang Daschner, Frankfurt Police Vice-President, ordered his subordinates to try to extract the necessary information by means of the infliction of pain, under medical supervision and subject to prior warning. Gaefgen testified that a police officer told him that a specialist was being flown by helicopter to Frankfurt who could inflict on me pain of sort I had never before experienced.Within twenty minutes after being so threatened, Gaefgen crumpled and admitted he had killed the child less than two hours of the kidnap. He then led police to the body. The actual infliction of pain, which in fact had been arranged by fetching a specially trained police officer, was not necessary. In 2003, Gaefgen was sentenced to life imprisonment. The information provided by him under the impression of the unlawful threat was not admitted as evidence.

Daschner pleaded “either I violated the rights of the suspect, or I put at risk the life of the victim. In weighing up the options it was clear to me what I had to do, and I would do the same again.” In 2004, Daschner was fined 10,800 Euro and the subordinate police officer was fined 3,600 Euro by the Regional Court at Frankfurt. See J. Hooper, Kidnap Case Presents Germans with Ugly Dilemma over Torture, The Guardian, Feb. 27, 2003, at 18; H. Cleaver, Kidnapper Gets Life for Murder of Banker’s Son in Pounds 700,000 Plot’, The Daily Telegraph, July 29, 2003, at 11; R. Boyes, Police Chief Sanctioned Torture’ to Save a Life’, The Times, Nov. 19, 2004, at 38 (emphasis added); F. Jessberger, ‘Bad Torture – Good Torture? What International Criminal Lawyers May Learn from the Recent Trial of Police Officers in Germany’, (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1066.

[64] 1950 J.C. 19.

[65] (2001) 31 EHRR 45.

[66] These reports are: People’s Republic of China: Serious Human Rights Violations and the Crackdown on Dissent Continue, Amnesty International, Sep. 2002, , AI Index: ASA 17/047/2002; Establishing the Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights: The Need for Institutional and Legal Reforms: Memorandum to the State Council and National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China by Amnesty International, Amnesty International, Sep. 2002, , AI Index: ASA 17/052/2002; Judges and Torture, Amnesty International, Jan. 2003, , AI Index: ASA 17/007/2003; China: The Role of Local Authorities in the Prevention of Torture, Amnesty International, Apr. 2003, , AI Index: ASA 17/019/2003; United Nations, Special Rapporteur on Torture Highlights Challenges at End of Visit to China (Beijing, United Nations, 2005).; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2005, Jan. 2005, (last visited July 20, 2007).

[67] K. G., Turner, J. V. Feinerman and R. K. Guy, (eds.), The Limits of the Law in China (Seattle, Washington University Press, 2000), 154-55.

[68] S. Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Legal Reform in China after Mao (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999); P. B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture (London, Routledge, 2001); S. C. Angle and M. Svensson (eds.), The Chinese Human Rights Reader (Armonk, An East Gate Book, 2001); M. Svensson, Debating Human Rights in China (Lanham, Roman & Littlefield, 2002); E. P. Mendes, and A. Lalonde-Roussy, (eds.), Bridging the Global Divide on Human Rights: A Canada-China Dialogue (England, Ashgate, 2003); N. J. Diamant, S. B. Lubman and K. J. O’Brien (eds.), Engaging the Law in China: State, Society and Possibilities for Justice (California, California University Press, 2005).

[69] G. Wehrfritz & M. Laris, Rulers are the Law’, Newsweek Atlantic Edition, Sept. 29, 1997, at 47.

[70] The Political-Legal Committee usually includes the deputy Party secretary of Political-Legal matters, the president of the court and procuracy, and the heads of various ministries or bureaus including public security, state security, justice and civil affairs. S. Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), 172.

[71] Mao Li Xin, ‘The Analysis of Wrongful Conviction of Yu Xiang Lin Case’ (2006) (last visited July 20, 2007).

[72] Article 43 of the Chinese Judges Law.

[73] Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

 Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

[74] Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights provides:

1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.

2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;

(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witness on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;

(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

[75] Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law…

2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law.

3. To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;

(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he under stands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;

(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;

(c) To be tried without undue delay;

(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;

(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;

(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court;

(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.

4. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.

5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.

6. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.

7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.

[76] Section 78(1) of PACE the provides:

In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to be the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.

[77] J. T. Boxer, ‘China’s Death Penalty: Undermining Legal Reform and Threatening National Economic Interest’ (1996) 22 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 618.

[78] n. 69 above, at 49.

[79] The Work Conference of the People’s Supreme Court in National Committee Report, Xinhua News Agency, March 13, 2007.

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